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We consider a selection process and a hierarchical institution in a dynamic model as in Harrington [3], where
agents are "climbing the pyramid" in a rank-order contest based on the "up or out" policy. Agents are ranked
according to the quality of their performances in a particular environment that they face in groups, and a fraction
of the highest ranked agents are promoted. The size of this fraction characterizes the selectivity of the process,
and we distinguish between local and global selectivity. We study the role of the degree of local and global
selectivity in the dynamic process where agentsﾒ’ types dier in their expected performances. Surprisingly, we
nd that an increase in the selectivity of the process can be detrimental to the agents with the highest expected
performances. In fact, it does not matter how small the expected performance of a particular type of agent is.
If the degree of selectivity is high enough, that type of agent will survive. However, if the selectivity decreases,
the only survivor is the agent with the highest expected performance.
JEL classication: D00; D23; C73; D72
Keywords:S o c i a lh i e r a r c h y ;S e l e c t i o n ;S e l e c t i v i t y ;P r o m o t i o n
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Selection processes exist in all societies. In general terms, agents interact with one another, within organizations
and institutions, and as a result of that interaction certain individuals are promoted over others and achieve
higher status in the form of greater political or economicp o w e r ,i n c r e a s e dp r e s t i g e ,m o r er e s p o n s i b i l i t ya n d
wider intellectual inuence. In such selection processes, the characteristics of the individual agents obviously
play an important role, but institutional factors such as the selectivity of the promotion system and hierarchical
structures are also highly inuential.
In this paper we present some interesting and counterintuitive properties of a family of selection systems
in a hierarchical institution. These selection systems arec h a r a c t e r i z e da c c o r d i n gt ot h ea m o u n to fs e l e c t i v i t y
implemented. In fact, we parameterize the degree of selectivity and study the dynamic of the process for all
possible values of the selectivity parameters.
In our model, the concept of degree of selectivity is determined by the fraction of agents promoted. For
example, consider a set of agents that are ranked by the outcomes of their activities or by any other "agentﾒ’s
characteristic". We then select a fraction  5 (0>1) of the highest ranked agents to be promoted. The closer
 is to zero, the greater the selectivity of the process. We can dene the degree of selectivity of the selection
process as 1  .
We consider a selection process and a hierarchical structure in a dynamic model as in Harrington [3], where
agents are "climbing the pyramid" in a rank-order contest based on the "up or out" policy. We generalize the
selection process used in Harrington.
Like Harrington, we do not consider strategic interaction and each agent is endowed, at w =0 ,w i t ho n eo f
two actions or behavioral rules: D and E.T h u s ,w ec o n s i d e ro n l yt w ot y p e s 1 of agent: type D and type E.T h e
environment where type D outperforms E is more frequent than the environment where E outperforms D.I n
this sense, D is a better type and has a higher expected success rate.
The population at any level of the hierarchy is matched in groups of q agents, and each group faces a particular
environment. Agents are ranked according to the quality of their performances in this particular environment.
The top n performing agents from each group become eligible for promotion: this is the local selection process.
The eligible agents are pooled together and the top fraction  of performing agents is promoted; this is the global
selection process.
In the next period, the agents promoted compete with one another again on their new level for promotion to
the following level, always under the "up or out" policy. Thus, the non-promoted agents are no longer considered
for promotion.
In our model, D-agents have good performances more often than E-agents. Therefore, we might expect
increases in selectivity to punish E-agents, and the proportion of E-agents promoted to decrease as selectivity
1Our main conclusion holds if more than two types are considered.
3increases. However, we show that this is not always the case, and, in fact, the proportion of E-agents promoted
increases if selectivity increases enough.
We obtain the following main results. If the level of selectivity is low enough, the selection process is not
strong enough to overcome the inertia of the initial population. The dynamic depends on the initial conditions,
and the population eventually becomes homogeneous, i.e. either type D or type E.I f s e l e c t i v i t y i n c r e a s e s
enough, the whole population will come to be type D for any initial mixed population. In that case, the selection
process is strong enough eventually to select agents of type D,t h eb e s tp e r f o r m e r s .F i n a l l y ,i ft h es e l e c t i v i t yi s
increased far enough, the behavior of the system depends only on local selectivity. If it is not too high, then only
D-agents survive as before. However, surprisingly, if local selectivity is increased far enough, type E agents also
survive, and the proportion for which they account at equilibrium increases as selectivity increases. Therefore,
no matter how low the success rate of a type is, if the selection process has a high enough selectivity, agents of
this type survive in the long run.
To understand why this happens, we must rst observe that the probability of promotion of a particular type
depends on three things: the initial proportions of each type of agent in the population, the selectivity of the
selection process, and the probability of success of each type of agent. If, for example, E-agents are scarce, the
rivals of a E-agent are mostly D-agents. In that case, almost the only way for that E-agent to get promoted
is to be better than D-agents. Otherwise, he is at the bottom of the rank order. Therefore, the probability of
promotion of a scarce type depends mainly on the probability of success of his type, and selectivity does not
aect him too much. By contrast, if a particular type, e.g. D-agents, is abundant, the rivals of an D-agent are
also mostly D-agents. Being successful is not too important for promotion because all D-agents are doing the
same thing. The probability of promotion depends mainly on the selectivity, on how many agents are promoted.
Therefore, an increase in selectivity tends to punish the more common type of agents because it decreases
their probability of promotion, but it does not aect the relatively scarce type. Thus, we can favor or punish
diversity by tuning the level of selectivity.Ad e e p e ri n t u i t i o ni sp r o v i d e di nS e c t i o n5 .
The structure of our model is quite similar to the way in which some sports competitions are organized.
There are dierent levels, players compete in separate groups at each level and the best players in each group
are promoted to the next level. The nal goal of each player is to get the top of the pyramid. In this example,
there is only local competition in groups.
In many social systems, however, there is not only local competition for promotion but also broader competi-
tion throughout each level. In the academic world, for example, students rst compete at their own universities
(local competition), and once they have nished their courses some of the mostb r i l l i a n ts t u d e n t sf r o ma l lu n i -
versities then compete for a position at a university department (global competition). If they are able to secure
ap o s i t i o nt h e yt h e nc o m p e t el o c a l l ya g a i n ,w i t h i nt h e i rn ew departments, to obtain a Ph.D.. After obtaining
their Ph.D., however, they must then compete generalo n c ea g a i nw i t ho t h e rP h . D .g r a d u a t e sf r o ma l lo t h e r
4universities for a limited number of jobs in a given number of organizations. Similar processes exist among
people who work in business. They rst compete within their own groups or departments (locally) and the best
among them become candidates for promotion. Those candidates, however, must sometimes compete again in a
broader context with candidates from other departments for promotion to a higher status.
As t y l i z e de x a m p l ew o u l db et h a to fas a l e sc o m p a n yt h a tp r o m o t e sp e o p l ea c c o r d i n gt ot h e i rs u c c e s si n
selling. The company employs men and women and men sell better to men and women sell better to women.
If the potential market has more men than women, men could be the D-agents and women the E-agents. In
another example, we can think of the rules (D and E)a sd i erent available technologies: one of them is the best
more often than the other, and agents are procient in either technology D or E.
In political careers we could consider two kinds of politicians: demagogues and principled politicians. The
demagogues could be the E-agents if they have the favor of the voters in some political environments that are
less probable than those in which the principle agents (D-agents) have the best results.
The promotion of E-agents may or may not be desirable depending on the nature of the situation and the
preferences of the institutions concerned.
It is not easy to nd an application that ts all of the modelﾒ’s elements because the model seeks to represent
af a m i l yo fc o m p l e xi n s t i t u t i o n si nav e r ys t y l i z e dm a n n e rt op o i n to u tav e r ys p e c i cc h a r a c t e r i s t i co fas e l e c t i o n
process. Obviously, in any real situation the selection process is inuenced by many more factors. However, we
believe that the property identied with our model is robust enough to play a role in more complex situations.
The rest of this article is presented as follows: Section 2 describes the model and the dynamic equations,
Sections 3, 4 and 5 analyze the dynamics and provide somei n t u i t i o n s ,a n dS e c t i o n6g i v e st h ec o n c l u s i o na n d
discusses related literature.
2T h e M o d e l
As in Harrington [3], we consider a hierarchical system with a lowest level and no upper bound on the highest
level. The initial population resides at the lowest level of the system, and comprises two types: D and E,w h i c h
compete for promotion. The objective is to analyze how the proportions of D-agents and E-agents in this initial
cohort of agents change as they migrate up through the hierarchy. This analysis is conducted for any degree of
selectivity. If the hierarchy is to be kept "full" then at the end of each round a fresh cohort of agents must enter
the lowest level to replace those who have moved on. Another structure that can be considered is a hierarchy
with just W levels where new agents imitate the agents at the top, as described in Harrington [4]. Note that the
two cases are equivalent if the new agents in this second case reproduce the prole of agents at the top.
Therefore, we consider that at level w there is a large enough population of agents (a continuum), where
dw 5 [0>1] denotes the proportion of D-agents at level w,a n dew the proportion of E-agents (with ew =1 dw
). We seek to specify a dynamic function dw+1 = i(dw) that relates the proportion of D-agents at level w to
5the proportion of D-agents after going through a selection process, i.e., the proportion of D-agents in the set of
agents promoted to level w +1 .
We consider that the agents at level w are randomly matched in groups of q  2.W e a s s u m e t h a t
the random matching process has the following properties: First,t h ep r o b a b i l i t yw i t hw h i c hag i v e na g e n ti s
matched with agents of given types equals the product of the proportions of agents of the respective types in
the population. Second,t h ep r o p o r t i o no fag i v e nc l a s so fg r o u p i n gi se q u a lt ot h ep r o b a b i l i t y( e x - a n t e )o fs u c h
ag r o u p i n g .T h ee x i s t e n c eo far a n d o mm a t c h i n gp r o c e s sh a v i n gt h e s ep r o p e r t i e si sp r o v e di nA l ó s - F e r r e r[ 1 ] 2.
Thus, the proportion of groups containing {D -agents (and v = q  {E -agents) is equal to the probability





w(1  dw)q{.T h i si sa l s ot h ep r o p o r t i o no fagents in groups with {D -agents with
regard to the initial population (level w)b e c a u s et h eg r o u p sa r ec o m p o s e do fe q u a ln u m b e ro fa g e n t s .
These agents face a stochastic environment which is the same for all the members of a particular group.
However, the environment of each group is stochastically independent of other groups. We categorize all the
dierent possible environments into three types. In a type 1 environment, D-agents respond correctly to the
environment and E-agents respond wrongly. In a type 2 environment, E-agents respond correctly and D-agents
wrongly. Finally, in type 3, neither D nor E responds correctly4.T h ep r o b a b i l i t y 5 of an environment of type l
is Sl,w i t hl =1 >2>3,a n d
P3
l=1 Sl =1 .T h e r e f o r e ,e a c ha g e n tf a c e sa nu n c e r t a i nf u t u r ee n v i r o n m e n t ,b u tt h e r e
is no aggregate uncertainty because of our assumptions. Therefore, at each level after the random matching, a
proportion S1 (S2, S3)o ft h eg r o u p sh a sat y p e1 (2>3)e n v i r o n m e n t .T h i si sa s s u m e dt ob ei . i . d .a c r o s sl e v e l s ,
so that the probability of an agent facing a given environment is independent of the environment that he/she
has faced in the past.





w(1  dw)q{S1.I n s u c h g r o u p s D-agents outperform E-agents. The system selects the n top performing
agents from each group, with n  q.T h i s p r o c e s s i s c a l l e d local selection.T h e s e l e c t e d a g e n t s f r o m e a c h
group become eligible for promotion or survival. The proportion of eligible agents is n
q with regard to the initial
population (level w). This ratio measures the selectivity of the local selection. Thus, if a group in a type 1
environment has more D-agents than vacancies available (i.e., {  n), then all the eligible agents selected from







However, if {?n,t h e n{ successful D-agents are selected as eligible and some unsuccessful E-agents have to be







w(1dw)q{S1.A n a l o g o u s l y ,af r a c t i o nS2 of groups will face a type 2 environment and similar reasoning
can be used. Finally, a fraction S3 of groups will face a type 3 environment. In this case, all the eligible
2Alós-Ferrer [1] gives a constructive existence proof for the case q =2 .T h eg e n e r a l i z a t i o nt og r o u p so fq agents is straightforward.
3The { is distributed as a binomial distribution, { v E(q>dw).
4Af o u r t he n v i r o n m e n tc a nb ec o n s i d e r e di nw h i c hb o t hr u l e sa r er i g h ta n s w e r s .T h i se n v i r o n m e n ta d d sn on e wi n s i g h t st ot h e
analysis, so we do not consider it.
5This probability Sl can also be seen as the expected success rate of an agents of type l,w i t hl =1 >2=





























w (1  dw)q{S1,a n d











w (1  dw)vS2.
Clearly, the proportion of eligible agents who are successful will be HVw = HVd
w + HVe
w.O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,t h e
proportion of eligible agents who are unsuccessful will be HXw =
n
q
 HVw.F i n a l l y , t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f e l i g i b l e
D-agents who are unsuccessful comprises two terms. First, the D-agents selected as eligible from the groups
under the type 2 environment that do not have enough E-agents to ll all the n vacancies, i.e. n  (q  {)
D-agents; and second the D-agents selected from the groups under the type 3 environment. The latter will
be a proportion n {























In the second step of the selection process, these eligible agents selected from each group are pooled together
and a new rank-order is made according their previous performances in their groups, with the eligible successful
agents on top and the unsuccessful ones after them. The top fraction  is eventually promoted to the next
level. This process is called global selection.T h ep a r a m e t e r measures the selectivity of the global selection
process. Thus, the proportion of agents eventually promoted is  n
q.
The dynamic equation dw+1 = i(dw) is a piecewise function which has two dierent pieces because two cases
can occur in global selection.
First case:t h ep r o p o r t i o no fa g e n t sp r o m o t e d(  n
q)i sHVw or less. In this case, the system selects a proportion
 n
q of agents randomly from among the eligible successful agents. Since the proportion of D-agents among the









Second case:t h ep r o p o r t i o no fa g e n t sp r o m o t e d(  n
q)i sg r e a t e rt h a nHVw.T h es y s t e mn o ws e l e c t sa l le l i g i b l e
successful agents plus a randomly selected proportion  n
q  HVw of eligible unsuccessful agents. Note that the
proportion of D-agents among the eligible unsuccessful agents is
HXd
w
HXw .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,t h ep r o p o r t i o no fD-agents







HXw with regard to the initial population (level w). Finally, the proportion of

















































q AH V w
(1)
The following property of the proportion of successful eligible agents (HVw)i sw o r t hp o i n t i n go u t :HVw has a
lower bound, which is reached when the whole population of the level is type E,i . e .ew =1 .A si n d i c a t e da b o v e ,
E-agents have a lower success rate because the type 2 environment is less probable than type 1,( S1 AS 2).
Thus, the proportion of successful agents is smallest when the whole population of agents is type E.N o t et h a t
6The number of E-agents in a group is v = q 3 {
7n
q is the proportion of eligible agents (all type E if ew =1 ), a fraction S2 of them from under environment type
2 and consequently successful. Therefore, if ew =1 ,t h e nHVw = n
qS2.W ec a ns t a t et h a ti na l lc a s e sHVw  n
qS2.
As a consequence, if the proportion of agents eventually promoted,  n
q,i sl o w e rt h a n n
qS2,t h e na l lt h ea g e n t s
promoted are successful eligible agents. Note that  n
q ? n
qS2 / ?S 2,s oi f?S 2 all agents promoted are
successful eligible agents.
Another interesting property derived from this is the following: For all  5 (0>S 2),t h ed y n a m i ci st h es a m e ,
i.e. the proportion of D-agents in the set of promoted agents does not change for any  5 (0>S 2).T h a ti sb e c a u s e
the system randomly chooses agents from among the eligible successful agents, so the proportion of D-agents
selected is always the same and equal to the proportion of D-agents among the eligible successful agents, i.e.
HVd
w
HVw .T h e r e f o r e ,t h ee ective selectivity of the global selection is limited because it is parameterized by .T h i s
result is related to our assumption of considering only two results: right and wrong. Consequently, in the pool
of eligible agents there are only two kinds of agent: successful and unsuccessful. If we had considered more
than two possible results7,t h er o l eo fg l o b a ls e l e c t i o nw o u l dh a v eb e e nm o r es i g n i cant. At the beginning of
Section 5, we show that if only global selection works, thec o m p o s i t i o ni nt h el o n gr u ni si d e n t i c a lf o ra n yl e v e l
of selectivity.
Remark 1 The proportion of agents who are successful (HVw)i sa l w a y s n
qS2 or greater. If ?S 2,a l lt h e
agents promoted are successful. For all  5 (0>S 2),t h ep r o p o r t i o no fD-agents among the agents promoted does
not change, and the eect of global selection on the population prole is identical for any level of global selectivity
in this interval. However, local selectivity always has an eect on the population prole.
We use V[q>n>] to denote the promotion system that selects n agents from groups of q agents in local selection
and a proportion  of eligible agents in global selection. We consider the following concept of equilibrium.
Denition 1 d 5 [0>1] is a globally stable equilibrium of the dynamic system given by dw+1 = i(dw) if for all
d0 5 (0>1), lim
w$4dw = d.A n d ,d £
V[q>n>]
¤
denotes d for the promotion system V[q>n>].
In the following sections, we analyze the dynamics. First, we study the simple case where q =2,i . e .
V[q=2>n=1>] and only global selection changes. After that, we xg l o b a ls e l e c t i o na n dl o c a ls e l e c t i o nc h a n g e s .
Eventually, we focus on the general case V[q>n>].
7For example, ten levels of success.
83S e l e c t i o n i n P a i r w i s e C o n t e s t V[q =2 >n=1 >]





i1(dw) li  n
q  HVw
i2(dw) li  n


















w)(1  S1(1  dw)S2)
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The following proposition gives us the globally stable equilibrium of the system under the selection process
V[q=2>n=1>],i . e . ,d[V[q=2>n=1>]].T h e e x p r e s s i o n r e p r e s e n t e d b y d is a root of the equation d  i2(d)=0
and depends on S1, S2 and .T h ee x p l i c i te x p r e s s i o nc a nb ef o u n da sd3 in the proof of proposition 1 in the
Appendix.
Proposition 1 Let S1 AS 2, ¯ 1 = 3S1S2
S1+S2,a n d¯ 2 =
S 2
1 +2S2S1(1+S2)
S2 ,a n dc o n s i d e rt h es e l e c t i o ns y s t e m
V[q=2>n=1>] specied by the Eq. (2). The globally stable equilibrium is:
ﾕ• If S1  2S2 then d[V[q=2>n=1>]]=1
ﾕ• If S1 ? 2S2 then8 d[V[q=2>n=1>]]=
;
A A A A ?
A A A A =
2S1S2
S1+S2 zkhq   ¯ 1
d zkhq ¯ 1 ??¯ 2
1 zkhq ¯ 2 ? 1
In addition, if  5 [¯ 1>¯ 2],t h e nd 5 [2S1S2
S1+S2 >1].M o r e o v e r ,d is increasing in =
The propositions outlined above establish that if D-agents are on average much better performers than E-
agents (S1  2S2), in the long run all agents will be type D.T h u s ,t h ev a l u eo f (global selectivity) does not
really matter, as we get the same result for any .T h ep e r f o r m a n c eo fD-agents is too strong.
On the other hand, if the gap between the two success rates S1 and S2 is not too large (S1 ? 2S2), in the
long run the population prole depends on the value of ,i . e . t h ed e g r e eo fs e l e c t i v i t yo ft h es y s t e m . T h u s ,
if selectivity is low enough, i.e.,  is greater than ¯ 2,i nt h el o n gr u na l la g e n t sw i l lb et y p eD.H o w e v e r , i f
selectivity increase and ?¯ 2, E-agents survive, and their proportion increases as selectivity increases. This
happens until  drops below a certain threshold (¯ 1). If ?¯ 1 (selectivity is maximum) the proportion of each
type of agent does not change with .T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h r e m a r k 1 .T h u s , i f s e l e c t i v i t y i s i n t e n s e t h e n
E-agents, who follow the rule with the lower success rate, survive in a greater proportion than for any other
value of .
The propositions outlined above therefore establish, surprisingly enough, that the more selective the system
is (smaller ), the higher the proportion of agents who follow the rule with the worse success rate is. We provide
ac o m p r e h e n s i v ei n t u i t i o na tt h ee n do ft h es e c t i o n5 .
8If S1 ? 2S2,t h e n¯ 1 ? ¯ 2 (see proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix).
9In this section, local selectivity is xed and only global selectionc h a n g e s .T h e r e f o r e ,t h ee ective selectivity
is limited because of remark 1. In next section, we xg l o b a ls e l e c t i o na n dc h a n g el o c a ls e l e c t i v i t yb ym e a no f
q.T h er a t i o1
q determines the level of local selectivity. Thus, we can increases the eective selectivity as much
as we want it.
4G r o u p s o f n a g e n t s w i t h n =1 , V[q>n =1 >]
In this section, we assume n =1and consider q as a parameter: The agents now interact in groups of q agents.
If we consider dierent group sizes, we can also consider a wide range of degrees of local selectivity. The level
of local selectivity is characterized by the quotient n
q:i nf a c ti ti s1 n
q.B yc h a n g i n gp a r a m e t e rq,w ec a nt h u s




To derive the dynamic equation, we detail the equation (1) for n =1 .
dw+1=
;
A A A ?

























To understand what happens in the long run, we consider two extreme cases, one in which there is no global
selection, (i.e.  =1 ), and another in which there is the strongest possible global selection (i.e.   S2).
4.1 The promotion system V[q>n =1 >=1 ]
In this case, there is no global selection,  =1 ,a n dE q .( 3)b e c o m e s :
dw+1 =( 1 (1  dw)q)S1 + dq
w S2 + dw(1  S1  S2) (4)
Let d
P1 be an inner root that belongs to the open interval (0>1) of the equation:
i2(dw)  dw =( 1 (1  dw)q)S1 + dq
w S2  dw(S1 + S2)=0 (5)
This root exists and is unique if S1 ? (q  1)S2 (see the proofs of the result in the Appendix).







P1 li S1 ? (q  1)S2
1 li S1  (q  1)S2
Proposition 3 In addition, d[V[q>n=1>=1]] is decreasing in q.T h u s ,d[V[q>1>=1]]  d[V[q+1>1>=1]],a n dt h e
inequality is strict if S1  (q  1)S2.
The propositions outline above establish that if D-agents are on average much better performers than E-
agents (S1  (q  1)S2), in the long run all agents will be type D.H o w e v e r , t h e p r e v i o u s p r o p o s i t i o n s a l s o











,t h u st h el e v e lo f
local selectivity will be in the interval [1
2>1)=
10demostrate that no matter how low the success rate of a type is, if the selection process has a high enough
selectivity, agents of this type survive in the long run. If q increases enough, type E agents survive and increase
in proportion. This might well seem paradoxical, but the intuition for it is in the section ??.
To conclude this section, note that if q goes to innity, Eq. (4) goes to the equation dw+1 = S1+dw(1S1S2),
and therefore d[V[q>1>=1]] goes to S1
S1+S2.T h u s ,d[V[q>1>=1]] 5 ( S1
S1+S2>1],a n dt h ep r o p o r t i o no fE-agents has
an upper bound.
4.2 The promotion system V[q>n =1 > S2]




always smaller than the proportion of eligible successful agents (HVw), (see remark (1)). Thus, we can rewrite
the Eq. (3)a s :
dw+1 =
(1  (1  dw)q)S1
(1  (1  dw)q)S1 +( 1 dq
w )S2
(6)
As in the previous section, we nd two possible kinds of long-run behavior: The entire population is type D,
and with both types of agent surviving. As before, it is not possible to nd an explicit expression for the inner
stady state, which we denote by d
P2.W h e r ed
P2 is a root of the equation:
dw+1  dw =
(1  (1  dw)q)S1
(1  (1  dw)q)S1 +( 1 dq
w )S2
 dw =0 (7)
This root belongs to the open interval (0>1),a n di te x i s t sa n di su n i q u ei fS1 ?q S 2,( s e et h ep r o o fo ft h e
result below in the Appendix).






P2 li S1 ?q S 2
1 li S1  qS2





w )S2 =0and it has the same roots as
the equation (1(1dw)q+1)S1 +d
q+1
w S2 d(S1 +S2)=0 .T h eo n l yd i erence between this last equation and
Eq. (5)i st h a tq +1appears instead of q.W ec a nt h e r e f o r es t a t et h a t :
d[V[q+1>1>=1]=d[V[q>1>S2]]
Therefore, if we increase the size of the groups by one individual, the eect in the long run is the same as
imposing the highest degree of global selectivity. In otherw o r d s ,i n c r e a s i n gl o c a ls e l e c t i v i t yb yi n c r e a s i n gf r o m
q to q +1is equivalent to increase the global selectivity by decreasing from  =1to   S2.
Moreover, since the solution is decreasing in q:
d[V[q>1>=1]  d[V[q>1>S2]]
11On the other hand, note that if q goes to innity, Eq. (6)g o e st ot h ee q u a t i o ndw+1 = S1
S1+S2,a n dt h e r e f o r e ,
d[V[q>1>S2] goes to S1
S1+S2.T h u s ,d[V[q>1>S2]] 5 ( S1
S1+S2>1] as before.
In this section, the level of local selectivity is specied by the expression 1 1
q,a n dt h u sw eh a v es of a ro n l y
considered levels of selectivity that are higher than 1
2.W en o wl o o ka tw h a th a p p e n sw h e nt h el e v e lo fs e l e c t i v i t y
is lower than 1
2,i . e .t h ep r o p o r t i o no fa g e n t sp r o m o t e di sg r e a t e rt h a n1
2.T ond the answer to this question
we look in the following section at the more general family of promotion systems V[q>n>].
5T h e G e n e r a l C a s e V[q>n>]
First, we show that if there isn ol o c a ls e l e c t i o n ,i . e . n
q =1 ,t h e nt h eg l o b a ls e l e c t i o nb yi t s e l fi sn o te n o u g ht o
produce a result dierent from d[V[q>n>]]=1 ,o n l yD-agent survive. The eect of global selection is bounded
as is shown in remark 1. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 Let S1 AS 2, n = q,a n dc o n s i d e rt h es e l e c t i o np r o c e s s e sV[q>n>] specied by the Eq. (1).
The globally stable equilibrium is: d[V[q>n>]]=1 .
We now consider the general promotion system with n?q .T h e o b j e c t i v e i s t o g i v e a g e n e r a l p i c t u r e o f
the dynamics involved. From now on, we simplify matters by considering that S3 =0(i.e. S1 + S2 =1 ). The
expression that we obtain if we expand Eq. (1) is far too large and complex, which makes it impossible for us
to work in the same way as we did in the previous sections. For this reason, we rst show an analytical result
that characterizes the local stability of the steady states d =0and d =1 .T h e n ,w es t a t eac o n j e c t u r et h a tw e
check by numerical analysis. After that, we can draw some conclusions.
Note that j(dw)=i(dw)  dw is a continuous function, the roots are the steady states, and the sign of j(dw)
determines whether dw increases or decreases. As d =0and d =1are always steady states of the system,
j(0) = j(1) = 0.O b v i o u s l y ,i fj(d) A 0 for any d 5 (0>%) with some %A0,t h e nd =0is unstable. Also, it is
unstable if j0(0) A 0.N e x t ,w ep r e s e n tar e s u l ta b o u tt h elocal stability of the steady states d =0and d =1 .
The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 Let S1 AS 2, S3 =0 , n
q ? 1 and consider the selection process V[q>n>] specied by the Eq. (1):
If  n






S1 then d =0and d =1are unstable.
n
q  S2
S1 then d =0is unstable and d =1is locally stable.
.
If  n
q 5 [S2>S 1],t h e nd =0is unstable and d =1is locally stable.
If  n
q AS 1,t h e nd =0and d =1are locally stable.
Therefore, only three types of behavior are possible. Type I, d =0and d =1are unstable. Note that, as
j(dw) is continuous, there must be at least one inner steady state (a root) in this case10.I ft h e r ew a so n l yo n e ,
10This is true by Bolzanoﾒ’s Theorem. On the one hand, if d =0and d =1are unstable, then j(d) is positive around d =0and
negative around d =1 .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,j(d) is continuous and j(0) = j(1) = 0.
12this would be globally stable, and E-agents would also survive. Type II, d =0is unstable and d =1is stable.
In this case, if there was no inner steady states, then d =1would be globally stable, and D-agents would be the
only survivors. Type III, d =0and d =1are stable. As in the rst case, there must be at least one inner steady
state. If there was only one, then both d =0and d =1would be locally stable and the basins of attraction
would be determined by that inner steady state.
Conjecture 1 In the open interval (0>1), j(d) has no roots in the second type described above and has only one
root in the rst and third types if S1 is not very close to S2
We check the validity of this conjecture by numerical analysis. It is presented in further detail in the
appendix. In order to conduct numerical analysis, values must be specied for a sizable subset of the functionﾒ’s
four parameters11: (n>q>>S1).A f t e r s p e c i f y i n g v a l u e s f o r (n>q>>S1),t h ee q u a t i o nj(d)=0becomes an
equation of just one variable, and it is a quotient of univariate polynomials. It is straightforward to prove that
the denominator is always positive, thus, we only have to check the roots in the open interval (0>1) of just one
univariate polynomial12.
Our numerical results conrm the validity of the conjecture13 if S1 is not very close to S2,s e eA p p e n d i xf o r
details. Therefore, we can draw some conclusions from Proposition 6. Under low enough levels of selectivity
( n
q AS 1)i nt h ep r o m o t i o ns y s t e m ,t h es e l e c t i o np r o c e s si sn o ts t r o n ge n o u g ht oo v e r c o m et h ei n e r t i ao f
the initial population. The dynamic depends on the initial conditions, and the population eventually becomes
homogeneous, i.e. either type D or type E.W e c a l l t h i s d y n a m i c s a s w|sh LLL.I f s e l e c t i v i t y i s i n c r e a s e d ,
the basin of attraction of the state d =1increases. If selectivity increases enough ( n
q 5 [S2>S 1]), the whole
population will be type D for any initial population. In that case, the selection process is strong enough to
eventually select the D-agents. We call this dynamic w|sh LL.F i n a l l y ,i ft h es e l e c t i v i t yi si n c r e a s e df a re n o u g h
( n
q ?S 2)t h eb e h a v i o ro ft h es y s t e md e p e n d so nl o c a ls e l e c t i v i t ya l o n e 14.I f t h a t s e l e c t i v i t y i s n o t t o o h i g h
(n
q  S2
S1), then only D-agents survive as before, i.e., the dynamic is also w|sh LL.H o w e v e r ,s u r p r i s i n g l y ,i ft h e
local selectivity is increased far enough ( n
q ? S2
S1 ), type E agents also survive. We call this dynamic w|sh L.
Therefore, no matter how low the success rate of a type is, if the selection process has a high enough selectivity,
agents of that type survive in the long run.
To understand why this happens, we must rst observe that the dynamic of the system depends on the
probabilities of promotion of each type of agent15.F o re x a m p l e ,i ft h es y s t e mi si nap e r i o dw and the probability
of an D-agent being promoted is greater than that of a E-agent, then the proportion of D-agents in period w+1
11In this section, S2 =( 13 S1).
12This simple numerical analysis does not present any di!culty and can be done with any mathematical software such as Math-
ematica or Matlab.
13When the performance of both actions (D and E)a r ev e r ys i m i l a r ,a n dc o n s e q u e n t l yS1 and S2 are close to 1
2,t h ed y n a m i c
can be more complicated in some very few particular cases. However, if actions are too similar, selection becomes less interesting.
More details are given in the Appendix.
14This is consistent with Remark 1.
15See proof of proposition 6.
13is greater than in w.I . e . , t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f D-agents increases and the proportion of E-agents decreases. To
simplify matters we consider a promotion system with local selection only16.L e tu sn o wf o c u so nap a r t i c u l a r
type of agent who faces one of the two following extreme scenarios:
ﾕ• If agents of this particular type are scarce (let us say close to extinction), an agent of this type will
generally match with agents of the other type17.T h u s , i n g e n e r a l , t h e r e w i l l o n l y b e o n e a g e n t o f t h i s
particular type in a group, who will only be promoted if he/she is successful (responds in the right way
to the environment). In this case, the rest of the agents in his/her group will be unsuccessful. Thus, if
an agent of this scarce type is successful, he/she is almost sure to get promoted. In such a context, the
probability of promotion of this particular type of agent is not inuenced by an increase in the degree of
selectivity in the system. His/her probability of promotion depends almost entirely on his/her probability
of success, i.e. it is S1 if the agent is type D and S2 otherwise.
ﾕ• However, when agents of this particular type abound (let us say the other type is close to extinction),
an agent of this particular type will generally match with agents of his/her own type17.T h u s ,i f a l l t h e
agents in a group are of the same type, they respond in the same way to the same environment. The
competitors of a particular agent in his/her own groupa r ea l s os u c c e s s f u l( o ru n s u c c e s s f u l )a sh e / s h ei s .
Thus, for purposes of promotion, it does not matter at all if this particular type of agent is successful or
not: the probability of promotion depends almost entirely on how many people are promoted. Therefore,
the probability of promotion of this particular type of agent is strongly inuenced by an increase in the
degree of selectivity in the system.
Therefore, an increase in selectivity tends to punish the more common type of agents because it decreases
their probability of promotion, but it does not aect the relatively scarce type. If selectivity is high enough, no
one type can be abundant enough to be the only survivor. Thus we can favor or punish diversity by tuning the
level of selectivity.
To give a clearer picture of just what is happening we present the following particular case. We continue to
consider only local selection ( =1 )a n da s s u m et h a tt h ed y n a m i co ft h em o d e li sw|sh LL.I nt h a tc a s e ,t h eo n l y
global equilibrium is the whole population being type D (d =1 ). Consequently, for any state of the system dw,
the probability of promotion of D-agents is greater than that of E-agents. In the rest of the paragraph, we focus
on states in which dw ' 1.W h e n dw ' 1,t h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fp r o m o t i o no fD-agents is approximately equal to
the proportion of agents promoted ( n
q), and the probability of promotion of E-agents is approximately equal to
their probability of success (S2). Obviously, if the dynamic is w|sh LL,t h e n n
q AS 2.H o w e v e r ,i fn
q is decreased
(selectivity increases), the probability of promotion of D-agents decreases, while the probability of promotion of
E-agents remains practically unchanged. Therefore, if n
q decreases beyond S2,t h e nt h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fp r o m o t i o n
16The argument is similar, though more complicated, if we also consider global selection.
17This happens with a probability close to one.
14of E-agents is greater than that of D-agents, and the proportion of D-agents will decrease in the next period.
When this happens, the homogeneous equilibrium d =1becomes unstable, and the system converges to a
stable globally mixed equilibrium in which there are agents of both types. The dynamic changes from w|sh LL
to w|sh L.
On the other hand, we can show by a similar argument that if n
q increases beyond S1,t h es t a t ed =0becomes
locally stable. In that case, for states of the system close to d =0 ,t h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fp r o m o t i o nf o rE-agents is
greater than for D-agents. In addition, the state d =1changes from globally to locally stable, and the dynamic
changes from w|sh LL to w|sh LLL.T h el e s ss e l e c t i v eas y s t e mi s ,t h ee a sier it is for it to be dominated by one
type of agent and for it to achieve homogeneity.
Therefore, if selectivity increases two forces workt o g e t h e r . O nt h eo n eh a n d ,t h em o r es e l e c t i v eas y s t e m
is, the more important an agentﾒ’s success or failure in the promotion becomes and, thus, the less important the
eect of the initial proportions of the dierent types of agent is. On the other hand, an increase in selectivity
tends to punish the more common type of agent because itd e c r e a s e st h e i rp r o b a b i l i t yo fp r o m o t i o nb u td o e s
not aect that of the relatively scarce type. Thus, selectivity can encourage diversity.
In this section, obviously, if we consider q =2the results are consistent with proposition 118.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we show that the degree of selectivity in a selection process can play an important and counter-
intuitive role even in the long run. By means of a dynamic model, we study the role of selectivity in a family
of promotion systems within a hierarchy. The dynamic depends on the probability of promotion of each type of
agent, which in turn depends on three factors: rst, the composition of the population, i.e. the proportion of
agents of each type; second, how strong the selection process is (which we measure with the level of selectivity);
and third, the probability of success in the activity undertaken by agents within the organization. We show that
an increase in selectivity tends to punish the more common type of agent because it decreases their probability
of promotion, while it does not aect the relatively scarce type. Consequently, we must be careful about the
degree of selectivity in the promotion mechanism within hierarchical social systems. As we show, if we wish to
increase the presence in the social system of certain agents with a high expected success rate we may, in certain
contexts, have to decrease the selectivity of the promotion mechanism rather than increasing it. By contrast,
we may have to increase the selectivity if we want to increase the presence of agents with low performances.
Our result depends largely on one particular critical assumption:I nag r o u p ,a l la g e n t so ft h es a m et y p ea r e
either better or worse than other types simultaneously, thus their successes (or failures) correlate perfectly with
one another. If two agents are under the same environment and are following the same rule and one of them is
successful, then the other will also be successful, or at least more successful than other types, with a probability
18Note that ¯ 2 =2 S2 when S3 =0
15of one. If that is the case, selectivity will have this paradoxical eect in the dynamic of the process. In the real
world it is not easy to nd a situation where this correlation is so strong. We expected that the stronger the
correlation is, the more noticeable this paradoxical eect will be.
The parameters that we use to measure the level of selectivity in the promotion system can be adjusted to
obtain the optimum population prole for an organization. Obviously, the rst step is to dene an institutional
payo function. We could consider this payo function as the aggregate of the payo of all the groups, and
the group payosa st h ea g g r e g a t eo fi n d i v i d u a lp e r f o r m a n c e s .F o re x a m p l e ,t h i sp a y o  function could depend
on the one hand on the institutional cost of having groups with no agents responding in the right way to the
environment. On the other hand, it could depend on the proportion of groups with at least one agent who
responds in the right way to the environment. After dening institutional payos, we can calculate the optimum
prole. By tuning19 the level of selectivity, we can get the optimum prole if the optimum is within certain
limits, though not all population proles can be achieved by tuning the level of selectivity.
This paper is closely related to a number of papers. In Harrington [3,6], he uses a selection process in a
hierarchical structure to compare the performance of rigid behavior with that of exible behavior. Harrington
considers only one particular selection process with a unique level of selectivity, while we consider a family of
selection processes that we characterize according to the amount of selectivity implemented. In Harrington[4,7],
he follows the same line of study but now introduces the concept of "social learning", i.e. young agents who
observe the older ones at the top of the hierarchy and imitate them. Finally, in Harrington [5], he adopts a
strategic approach. In these papers, the degree of selectivity is always 1
2.I nf a c t ,t h ep r o m o t i o ns y s t e mt h a th e
uses in his papers is V[q=2>n=1>=1].T h u s ,t h el e v e l o fs e l e c t i v i t y i sxed, and there is no global selection. By
contrast, Vega-Redondo[11] employs only global selection, although with a dierent approach and purpose.
Although Harrington considers more kinds of agent behavior, our result can be applied to his model. Re-
garding Harrington [3] which was the main inspiration of the present paper, we could say that his results would
change if the degree of selectivity increases or decreases. If the level of selectivity is increased enough, the stable
equilibrium where the entire population follows the mosts u c c e s s f u lr i g i dr u l ew i l ll o s ei t ss t a b i l i t ya n dt h e r e
will be a heterogeneous population in the long run following dierent rules. And if the degree of selectivity is
decreased enough, all the homogenous equilibria become locally stable equilibria. We can make this assertion
because the reasoning in the previous section can be applied to his model.
The present paper is also related to the literature ont o u r n a m e n t sd e v e l o p e ds i n c et h es e m i n a lp a p e rb y
Lazear and Rosen [9]. There are some papers which have also focused on the selection role of contests, e.g.,
Rosen ([10], Section V), and Hvide and Kristiansen [8].
An interesting extension would be to analyze the roleo fs e l e c t i v i t yw i t has t r a t e g i ca p p r o a c h ,a n dh o wt h e
level of selectivity can modify individual behavior.
19This makes sense if the system only selects according to performance and not to type. This can happen if the types are not
observable, the types are related to gender, race, or nationality and it is therefore politically incorrect, and so on.
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Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We assume S1 AS 2 A 0, S1 + S2  1,  5 [0>1], dw 5 [0>1],a n dw eo m i tt h et i m es u b s c r i p tw h e r e v e ri ti s
not confusing to do so.
The dynamic of the selection process V[] is given by the equation:
dw+1 = i(dw)=
(
i1(dw) li k(dw)  0


















w)(1  S1(1  dw)S2)
´
li
S2+2S 1dw(S 1+S 2)d2
w?0
(8)
Note that to analyze the dynamics of dw+1 = i(dw),i ts u !ces to study the function:
j(dw)=i(dw)  dw =
(
j1(dw)=i1(dw)  dw li k(dw)  0
j2(dw)=i2(dw)  dw li k(dw) ? 0
(9)
Thus, if ﾈǆ d 5 [0>1] is a root of j(dw),i . e . ,j(ﾈǆ d)=0 ,t h e nﾈǆ d is a steady state of dw+1 = i(dw),i . e . ,ﾈǆ d = i(ﾈǆ d).I n
addition, if j(dw) B 0,t h e ndw : dw+1.
Obviously, d =0(all the population is type E)a n dd =1(all the population is type D)a r ea l w a y ss t e a d y
states, and, therefore roots of j(d).
For example, in our model, if j(d) A 0 for all d 5 (0>1),t h e nd =1is a globally stable equilibrium, i.e., for
any initial condition belonging to (0>1) the system converges to d =1 .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i ft h e r ei so n l yo n e
inner root ﾈǆ d,i . e .j(ﾈǆ d)=0 ,a n dj(d) A 0 for all d 5 (0>ﾈǆ d),a n dj(d) ? 0 for all d 5 (ﾈǆ d>1),t h e nﾈǆ d is a globally
stable equilibrium. An inner root is a root that belongs to the open interval (0>1)=
As the proof is long and involves several steps, it is useful rst to present an outline of the proof: First, we
show that j(d) is continuous. Second, we calculate the roots of j(d),w h i c ha r et h es t e a d ys t a t e so ft h ed y n a m i c
equation. With this purpose, we calculate the roots of j1(d) and j2(d),a n dw ep r o v et h a tt h ef u n c t i o nj(d)
has either no inner roots or only one. In fact, we prove that if S1  2S2,t h e nt h e r ea r en oi n n e rr o o t s ,a n di f
S1 ? 2S2,t h e nt h e r em a yb eo n ei n n e rr o o td e p e n d i n go nt h ev a l u eo f.
After that, we analyze the stability of the steady states, which can be done by checking the sign of j(d)
between the steady states. In fact, it su!ces to check the sign of the rst derivatives of j(d) in d =0and d =1 .
Note that on the one hand j(d) is continuous, on the other hand j(0) = 0, j(1) = 0,a n dt h e r ei se i t h e ro n e
inner steady state or none. Thus, it can be stated that if j0(0) A 0 then j(d) must be greater than zero between
d =0and the second steady state. If there is no inner steady state, i.e. the second steady state is d =1 ,i t
can be stated that j(d) must be greater than zero for all d 5 (0>1).T h i sm e a n st h a tf o ra n yi n i t i a lc o n d i t i o n
d 5 (0>1) the system converges to d =1 ,i . e . ,d =1is globally stable equilibrium. However, if there is an inner
steady state, then j(d) is positive between d =0and that inner steady state and negative between that inner
steady state and d =1 .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,t h es y s t e mc o n v e r g e st ot h es a i di n n e rs t e a d ys t a t e .
We also need to prove that there are no periodic points. Note that we work with dierence equations because
we consider discrete time, and there may be periodic points.
We prove the proposition in several steps.
Lemma 1 The function j(dw)=i(dw)  dw is continuous in [0>1].
It is straightforward to show that i1(dw) and i2(dw) are continuous: Both functions are quotients of polyno-
mials and both denominators are strictly greater than zero. Furthermore, if S2 +2S1dw (S1 +S2)d2
w = ,t h e n
i1(dw)=i2(dw)= Since i(dw) is continuous, j(dw)=i(dw)  dw is also continuous.¥
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The following lemma determines the inner roots of the function j(d) for d 5 (0>1).
Lemma 2 a) If S1  2S2,t h e nj(d) has no inner roots.
b) If S1 ? 2S2,t h e nj(d) has either one or inner root or none depending on the value of =
b.1) If ?¯ 1 = 3S1S2
S1+S2,t h e nt h ei n n e rr o o tw i l lb e¯ d3 = 2S1S2
S1+S2 ,
which is the only possible inner real root of j1(d).
b.2) If  5 (¯ 1>¯ 2),w i t h¯ 2 =
S 2
1 +2S2S1(1+S2)
S2 ,t h e nt h ei n n e rr o o tw i l lb ed3,
which is the only possible real root of j2(d) in the interval (0>1).
b.3) Finally, when   ¯ 2,t h e r ei sn oi n n e rr o o t .
Several steps are also needed to prove this lemma. As the roots of j(d) have to be roots of either j1(d) or
j2(d),w erst calculate the roots of j1(d),w h i c hr e v e a l st h a tt h e r ei so n l yo n er o o t( c a l l e d¯ d3)i na d d i t i o no n
d =0and d =1 .S e c o n d ,w ec a l c u l a t et h er o o t so fj2(d),w h i c hs h o w st h a tt h e r ea r et w or o o t s( c a l l e dd3 and
d4)i na d d i t i o no nd =0and d =1 .T h e nw ep r o v et h a td4  1,a n dd3 A S1
S1+S2 A 0.W ea l s op r o v et h a td3 ? 1
if and only if  5 [0>¯ 2).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,t h eo n l yc a n d i d a t e sf o ri n n e rr o o t so fj(d) are ¯ d3 and d3.W es h o ww h e n
either ¯ d3 or d3 is the root of j(d).W ea l s os h o wt h a ti ti sn o tp o s s i b l ef o rb o t h¯ d3 and d3 simultaneously to be
roots of j(d).W ep r o v et h ea b o v el e m m au s i n gC l a i m s( 2 . 1 ) - ( 2 . 6 ) .
Claim 2.1 a) j1(d) has a root, ¯ d3 in addition on d =0and d =1 .
b) ¯ d3 = 2S1S2
S1+S2  1 +, S1  2S2




w  dw = dw (dw  1)
(S1+S2)dw+(S22S1)
S2+2S1dw(S1+S2)d2
w ,a n dt h ed e n o m i -
nator is greater than zero. The equation j1(dw)=0has the following roots:
¯ d1 =0 ¯ d2 =1 ¯ d3 = 2S1S2
S1+S2
The root ¯ d3 = 2S1S2
S1+S2 A 0,a n di ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt os h o wt h a t2S1S2
S1+S2 ? 1 +, S1 ? 2S2.
Claim 2.2 a) j2(d) has two roots, d3 and d4 in addition on d =0and d =1 .
b) d4 @ 5 (0>1)
c) d3 5 ( S1
S1+S2>1) if and only if  5 [0>¯ 2).A n d ,Cd 3
C A 0

















It is straightforward to show that the denominator
¡
1  2dwS1  S2 + d2
w(S1 + S2)
¢
A0.T h u s ,t h ee q u a t i o n









+ dw (2S1 (S1  S2)+( S1 + S2)(1 )) + S2(1  S2)  S1 (2    S2)
Let sro[dw]=d2








 =2 S1 (S1  S2)+( S1 + S2)(1 ) A 0
 = S2(1  S2)  S1 (2    S2) ? 0
(10)
It is tedious but straightforward to prove that the discriminant is:

2  4 =( S1 + S2)
2 (1  )
2  4(S1  S2)
2 ((S1 + S2)(1 S2)  S2
1) (11)
If the discriminant 
















2 ? 1 /  
p

2  4 A 2 /
p

2  4 A 2 + 
Therefore, if d4 ? 1,t h e n2 + ?0 is necessary condition. Next we show that it is not possible for both
conditions to hold simultaneously; 
2  4  0 (real d4)a n d2 + ?0.
Using (10) and (11) it is straightforward to show that:
First, 2 + ?0 +, (S1 + S2)(1 )  2S2 (S1  S2) ? 0
+, (S1 + S2)
2 (1  )
2 ? (2S2 (S1  S2))
2,
and second, 
2  4  0 +, (S1 + S2)
2 (1  )
2  4(S1  S2)
2 ((S1 + S2)(1 S2)  S2
1)  0
+, (S1 + S2)
2 (1  )
2  4(S1  S2)
2 ((S1 + S2)(1 S2)  S2
1)
Combining the above expressions:
4(S1  S2)
2 ((S1 + S2)(1 S2)  S2
1)  (S1 + S2)
2 (1  )
2 ? (2S2 (S1  S2))
2
Therefore, the following expression is a necessary condition for 2 + ?0 and 
2  4 A 0 to hold
simultaneously:
4(S1  S2)
2 ((S1 + S2)(1 S2)  S2
1) ? (2S2 (S1  S2))
2
/ (S1 + S2)(1 S2)  S2
1  S2
2 ? 0
We obtain a contradiction because it is straightforward to show that the above expression is always greater
than zero. Thus, 2 + ?0 and 
2  4  0 cannot hold simultaneously, and d4 cannot be smaller than one
(d4 @ 5 (0>1)). Consequently, d4 cannot be an inner root of j(d).I na d d i t i o n ,i f
2  4 =0 , d3 = d4 @ 5 (0>1).
Now, we prove part f) of the Claim (2.2): d3 5 ( S1
S1+S 2>1) if and only if  5 [0>¯ 2).
Initially, we prove that  5 [0>¯ 2)= , d3 5 ( S1
S1+S 2>1).W erst prove that d3 is a real number if  5 [0>¯ 2).
Then we prove that if d3 is real, then d3 is greater than S1
S1+S 2 ,i n c r e a s i n gi n,a n d1 when  = ¯ 2.
Using expression (11),
C(24)
C =2 ( S1 + S2)
2 (  1) ? 0.T h u s , 
2  4 is decreasing in .O n t h e
other hand if  = ¯ 2 =
S 2
1 +2S2S1(1+S2)














¢2 A 0.A sd3 is real if the discriminant is non-negative, i.e. 
2 4  0,t h e
root d3 has to be real if  5 [0>¯ 2).
We now prove that d3 A S1









2  4 ? 2 S1
S1+S 2 + .I ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt os h o wt h a t2 S1
S1+S 2 +
 =( S1 + S2)(1 ) A 0.T h u s ,d3 A S1
S1+S 2 +, 
2  4 ? (S1 + S2)
2 (1  )
2
/ (S1 + S2)
2 (1  )
2  4(S1  S2)
2 ((S1 + S2)(1 S2)  S2
1) ? (S1 + S2)
2 (1  )
2
/ 4(S1  S2)
2 ((S1 + S2)(1 S2)  S2
1) ? 0.I t s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d t o s h o w t h a t t h e a b o v e e x p r e s s i o n i s
always negative.













2  4) 1
2 C(
24)








/ (S1 + S2)+1
2(
2  4) 1
22(S1 + S2)
2 (  1) ? 0 / (
2  4) ? (S1 + S2)
2 (1  )
2
/ (S1 + S2)
2 (1  )
2  4(S1  S2)
2 ((S1 + S2)(1 S2)  S2
1) ? (S1 + S2)
2 (1  )
2
/ 4(S1  S2)
2 ((S1 + S2)(1 S2)  S2
1) A 0.A se x p r e s s i o n(S1 + S2)(1 S2)  S2
1 is clearly greater than
zero, it can be stated that Cd 3
C A 0.














=( 2  + )







+( 2 S1 (S1  S2)+( S1 + S2)(1 )) + (S2(1  S2)  S1 (2    S2))
/ 0=2 S2  S1 + S2




S2 = ¯ 2
Therefore, we have proved that if  5 [0>¯ 2) then d3 is real. And if d3 is real then d3 has to be greater than
S1
S1+S 2,i n c r e a s i n gi n,a n d1 when  = ¯ 2.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,i f 5 [0>¯ 2) then d3 belongs to ( S1
S1+S 2>1).
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We next prove part f) of Claim (2.2) in the other direction: d3 5 ( S1
S1+S 2>1) =,  5 [0>¯ 2)=
If d3 5 ( S1
S1+S 2>1) then d3 is real. We have shown above that if d3 is real then Cd 3
C A 0 and d3 =1if and
only if  = ¯ 2.T h u s ,i fd3 5 ( S1
S1+S 2>1) then  5 [0>¯ 2).
Claim 2.3 If d0 @ 5 {¯ d3>d 3},t h e nd0 is not an inner root of j(d).
This claim is true because, rst, j(d)=
(
j1(d) li k(d)  0
j2(d) li k(d) ? 0
;a n d ,s e c o n d ,j1(d) has only one possible
root in the interval d 5 (0>1),w h i c hi s¯ d3,a n dj2(d) has only one possible root in the interval d 5 (0>1),w h i c h
is d3.
The following result denes a property of thresholds ¯ 1 and ¯ 2 which will be useful later.
Claim 2.4 Let ¯ 1 = 3S1S2
S1+S2 and ¯ 2 =
S 2
1 +2S2S1(1+S2)
S2 . ¯ 1  ¯ 2 +, S1  2S2






S2 / (S1  2S2)(S2 + S1(1  S1  2S2))  0
Since (S2 + S1(1  S1  2S2) A 0,t h es i g nd e p e n d so n(S1  2S2).
Claim 2.5 If S1  2S2,t h e nj(d) has no inner roots.
By Claim (2.3), only ¯ d3 and d3 can be inner roots of j(d).B y C l a i m ( 2 . 1 ) , i f S1  2S2,t h e n¯ d3  1.
Therefore, ¯ d3 cannot be an inner root if S1  2S2.
We now show that d3 cannot be an inner root of j(d) if S1  2S2.N o t et h a ti fk(d3)  0 then d3 cannot be
an inner root of j(d),s e ee x p r e s s i o n( 9 ) .T h u s ,w es h o wt h a ti fS1  2S2 then k(d3)  0.
Consider k(d3)=S2+2S1d3(S1+S2)d
2






g 1=2 gd 3
g (S1(S1+S2)d3)  1 ? 0.I ti ss m a l l e rt h a nz e r ob e c a u s e
gd 3
g A 0 and d3 A S1
S1+S 2,s e eC l a i m( 2 . 2 ) .T h e r e f o r e ,
gk (d3()>)
g ? 0,i . e .i f decreases, k(d3) increases.
As shown in Claim (2.2), d3 =1if and only if  = ¯ 2.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,i fk(d3(¯ 2)>¯ 2)  0 then d3 is not an





S2  0 / 1
S2 (S1  2S2)(1 S1)  0 / S1  2S2.
The following result shows when ¯ d3 and d3 are roots of j(d).N o t et h a tt h es i g no fk(d) determines whether
j(d)=j1(d) or j(d)=j2(d),s e ee x p r e s s i o n( 9 )
Claim 2.6 Let S1 ? 2S2.
a) [¯ d3 5 (0>1) and k(¯ d3)  0] /   ¯ 1.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,i fA¯ 1 then ¯ d3 cannot be an inner root of j(d).
b) [d3 5 (0>1) and k(d3) ? 0] /  5 (¯ 1>¯ 2).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,i f@ 5 (¯ 1>¯ 2) then d3 cannot be an inner root of j(d).
We prove the rst part of the claim, k(¯ d3)  0 /   ¯ 1 = 3S1S2
S1+S2:
By Claim (2.1), ¯ d3 ? 1 +, S1 ? 2S2.F r o m e x p r e s s i o n ( 8 ) , k(¯ d3)=2 S1¯ d3  (S1 + S2)(¯ d3)
2 + S2   =
2S1
2S1S2





+ S2    0 +, 3S1S2
S1+S2    0=
The proof of part e) of the claim (k(d3) ? 0 /  5 (¯ 1>¯ 2))i sal i t t l el o n g e r .F i r s tn o t et h a t ,b yC l a i m( 2 . 4 ) ,
¯ 1 ? ¯ 2 +, S1 ? 2S2.










2 ) = 2S1S2
S1+S2 .I nt h er a d i c a n d ,t h ee x p r e s s i o nS12S2
1 +S2+S1S22S2
2
is positive if S1 ? 2S2.T h u s ,i f = ¯ 1 then d3|=¯ 1 = 2S1S2
S1+S2 =¯ d3
Therefore, if  = ¯ 1 then k(d3)=k(¯ d3)=0 ,s e ep a r td) of this Claim. On the other hand, it is proven in the
previous Claim that k(d3) is strictly decreasing in .T h u s ,k(d3) A 0 when ?¯ 1,a n dk(d3) ? 0 when A¯ 1.
In the case when   ¯ 2,C l a i m( 2 . 2 )s h o w st h a td3  1.
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Consequently, if [S1 ? 2S2 and ?¯ 1] then ¯ d3 is the unique inner root of j(d).I f[S1 ? 2S2 and  5 (¯ 1>¯ 2)]
then d3 is the unique inner root of j(d).I f[S1 ? 2S2 and   ¯ 2)] then j(d) has no inner roots.¥
Before analyzing the stability of the steady states, we prove that there are no periodic points20 of dw+1 = i(dw).
Lemma 3 dw+1 = i(dw) has no periodic points.
By Claim (2), the function i(dw)=
(
i1(dw) li k(dw)  0
i2(dw) li k(dw) ? 0
has either only one inner steady state in (0>1)
or none at all. If the function has none, there are obviously no periodic points because either dw Ad w+1 for all
dw 5 (0>1) or dw ?d w+1 for all dw 5 (0>1).I nt h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h e r ei so n es t e a d ys t a t ei n(0>1),i ft h ef u n c t i o ni s
increasing in the interval between the inner steady state and one, any possibility of there being periodic points
completely disappears because for all dw equal to or greater than the inner steady state (ﾈǆ d)e i t h e rdw ?d w+1 for
all dw 5 (ﾈǆ d>1) or dw Ad w+1 for all dw 5 (ﾈǆ d>1),a n da l w a y sdw+1  ﾈǆ d. Thus, it su!ces to prove that the function
i(dw) is increasing from values that are higher than the inner steady state. We study the derivatives of i1(dw)
and i2(dw).









2(1  dw + d2
w)S1S2
(S2 +2 S1dw  (S1 + S2)d2
w)
2 A 0






2S1  dwS1 +( 1 S1  (1  dw)S2))
  (S2 +2 S1dw  (S1 + S2)d2
w)
1  (S2 +2 S1dw  (S1 + S2)d2
w)
¶
Let z(dw)=S2 +2 S1dw  (S1 + S2)d2
w,w h i c hi sac o n c a v ef u n c t i o nw i t ham a x i m u mi ndw = S1
S1+S2.N o t e








(1  S1  S2)dw + S2d2
w













(1  S1  S2)dw + S2d2
w
¢ z0(dw)(  1)
(1  z(dw))2
¶
All the terms in the previous expression are always positive except (1) (which is negative) and z0(dw) (which
may be either positive or negative). The function z(dw) is concave, with a maximum in dw = S1
S1+S2.T h u s ,
z0(dw) ? 0 when dw A S1
S1+S2,a n di2(dw) will be increasing in dw 5 [ S1
S1+S2>1].
As i1(dw) and i2(dw) are increasing in dw 5 [ S1
S1+S2>1], i(dw) is also increasing in dw 5 [ S1
S1+S2>1].
By Claim (2.2), d3 A S1
S1+S2.O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,¯ d3 = 2S1S2
S1+S2 A S1
S1+S2 / S1 AS 2.A s¯ d3 and d3 are the
only candidates for inner steady states, it can stated that the function i (dw) is increasing in the interval between
the inner steady state and one. Therefore, there are no periodic points.¥
From now on, it can considered that there are no periodic points, and there is no need to mention them
further.
We now study the stability of the steady states of i(d),w h i c ha r et h er o o t so fj(d).W en e e dt h ef o l l o w i n g
results, which show the sign of the derivative of j(d) in d =0and d =1 .
Lemma 4 d) j0(0) A 0
e)
h
?ﾈǆ 2 and 2S2 AS 1
i
, j0(1) A 0
20It is possible in dierence equations for a solution not to be a steady point. Thus, point e is called a periodic point of {w+1 = i({w)
if in(e)=e for some positive integer n,i . ee is again reached after n iterations. See Elaydi [2].
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If j0
1(0) A 0 and j0
2(0) A 0 then j0(0) A 0.A s j0
1(dw)=i
0
1(dw)  1,i ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt os h o wt h a t
j0
1(0) = 2S1
S2  1.S i n c eS1 AS 2,w ec a ns t a t et h a tj0
1(0) A 0.O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,a sj0
2(dw)=i
0
2(dw)  1,i ti s




(S21) ,t h ed e n o m i n a t o ri sn e g a t i v e(S2  1)?0,a n di ti s
easy to show that the numerator is also negative, S2 S2

















(S11) .T h ed e n o m i n a t o r
is negative, (S1  1)?0,a n dt h en u m e r a t o ri sn e g a t i v ei fa n do n l yi f?
S 2
1 +2S2S1(1+S2)
S2 = ﾈǆ 2= Therefore
j0
2(1) A 0 if and only if ?ﾈǆ 2=
Therefore, if either 2S2 AS 1 and @ 5 (¯ 1>¯ 2) or 2S2  S1,t h e nt h e r ea r en oi n n e rr o o t sb yL e m m a( 2 ) ,a n d
as j0(0) A 0 the system converges to d =1 .I f2S2 AS 1 and ?¯ 2,b yL e m m a( 2 )t h e r ei so n ei n n e rr o o t ,a n d
as j0(1) A 0 the system converge to the inner root. This inner root is either ¯ d3 if   ¯ 1 or ¯ d3 if  5 (¯ 1>¯ 2).¥
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We assume S1 AS 2
The dynamics of the selection process V[q>n=1>=1] is given by the equation:
dw+1 = i(dw)=( 1 (1  dw)q)S1 + dq
w S2+dw(1  S1  S2)
Let j(dw)=i(dw)dw =( 1(1dw)q)S1 +dq
w S2 dw(S1 +S2).T h es o l u t i o n so ft h ee q u a t i o nj(dw)=0are the
steady points.
As that equation does not have an explicit solution, we study the rst and the second derivatives:
j0(dw)=q(1  dw)q1S1 + qd
q1
w S2  (S1 + S2)
j00(dw)=q(q  1)(1  dw)q2S1 + q(q  1)d
q2
w S2
We now calculate the inection points:


























Therefore, if qA2 we can then state that the function j(dw) has no more than one inection point in dw 5 (0>1).
As ﾈǆ d must be smaller than one, (S2
S1)
1
q2 must be positive (no negative roots).
Obviously, d =0and d =1are roots of the equation j(dw)=0 .T h es e c o n dd e r i v a t i v ea tt h e s ep o i n t sa r e
j00(0) = q(q  1)S1 ? 0 and j00(1) = q(q  1)S2 A 0.T h e r e f o r e ,t h ef u n c t i o nj(dw) is concave at dw =0and
convex at dw =1 .A sj(dw) is continuous in dw 5 [0>1],t h ef u n c t i o nj(dw) is concave in dw 5 [0>ﾈǆ d) and convex in
dw 5 (ﾈǆ d>1].
On the other hand the rst derivatives of j(dw) at d =0and d =1are:
j0(0) = (q  1)S1  S2 A 0,t h u s ,t h ef u n c t i o nj(dw) is increasing at d =0 .
j0(1) = (q  1)S2  S1,t h u s ,t h ef u n c t i o nj(dw) at d =1is either increasing if (q  1)S2 AS 1 or decreasing
if (q  1)S2 ?S 1
Therefore, if (q  1)S2 AS 1,t h ef u n c t i o nj(dw) is necessarily equal to zero only in one point in the open
interval (0>1).C a l l i n gt h i sp o i n td
P1,w ec a ns t a t et h a tt h ef u n c t i o nj(dw) is greater than zero in dw 5 (0>d 
P1)
and smaller that zero in dw 5 (d




P1 if (q  1)S2 AS 1.
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On the other hand, if (q  1)S2  S1,t h e nt h ef u n c t i o nj(dw) can not have a value of zero in the interval
(0>1).M o r e o v e r ,j(dw) will be positive in dw 5 (0>1),t h u sd £
V[q>n=1>=1]
¤
=1if (q  1)S2  S1=
To complete the proof we need only note that periodical points are not possible. This is because the rst
derivative of the function i(dw) is positive and, as such, i(dw) is increasing: i(dw)=( 1 (1  dw)q)S1 + dq
w S2 +
dw(1S1 S2) and i0(dw)=q(1dw)q1S1 +qd
q1
w S2 +(1S1 S2) A 0 Periodical points are therefore not
possible.¥
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
It is only necessary to prove that d
P1|q Ad 
P1|q+1,i fS1  (q  1)S2
Let j(d;¯ q)be the function j(dw) evaluates in dw = d,w i t ht h ep a r a m e t e rq =¯ q.
Let d
P1 =ﾘǜ d if q =¯ q,a n dl e td
P1 =  d if q =¯ q +1 .T h u s ,j(ﾘǜ d;¯ q)=0and j( d;¯ q +1 )=0
We wish to prove that  d?ﾘǜ d if (¯ q  1)S2 AS 1.
Note that proving the previous statement is the same as proving that j(ﾘǜ d;¯ q +1 )? 0 because of the charac-
teristics of the function j(dw).T h e r e f o r e ,i ts u !ces to prove that j(ﾘǜ d;¯ q +1 )? 0.
As j(ﾘǜ d;¯ q)=0 ,
j(ﾘǜ d;¯ q)=( 1 (1  ﾘǜ d)¯ q)S1 +ﾘǜ d¯ qS2  ﾘǜ d(S1 + S2)=0/
/ (1  ﾘǜ d)S1  (1  ﾘǜ d)¯ qS1 +ﾘǜ d¯ qS2  ﾘǜ dS2 =0 (12)
/
ﾘǜ d  ﾘǜ d¯ q
(1  ﾘǜ d)  (1  ﾘǜ d)¯ q =
S1
S2
On the other hand, j(ﾘǜ d;¯ q +1 )=( 1 (1  ﾘǜ d)¯ q+1)S1 +ﾘǜ d¯ q+1S2  ﾘǜ d(S1 + S2) is smaller than 0 if and only if:
(1  ﾘǜ d)S1  (1  ﾘǜ d)¯ q+1S1 +ﾘǜ d¯ q+1S2  ﾘǜ dS2 ? 0
Given Eq. (12), the previous expression will be true if and only if:
ﾘǜ d¯ qS2  ﾘǜ d¯ q+1S2 A (1  ﾘǜ d)¯ qS1  (1  ﾘǜ d)¯ q+1S1 / ﾘǜ d¯ qﾘǜ d¯ q+1
(1ﾘǜ d)¯ q(1ﾘǜ d)¯ q+1 A S1
S2(= ﾘǜ dﾘǜ d¯ q
(1ﾘǜ d)(1ﾘǜ d)¯ q)
/ ﾘǜ d¯ qﾘǜ d¯ q+1
(1ﾘǜ d)¯ q(1ﾘǜ d)¯ q+1 A ﾘǜ dﾘǜ d¯ q
(1ﾘǜ d)(1ﾘǜ d)¯ q / ﾘǜ d¯ q2
(1ﾘǜ d)¯ q2 A 1ﾘǜ d¯ q1
1(1ﾘǜ d)¯ q1 / ﾘǜ d¯ q2
1ﾘǜ d¯ q1 A
(1ﾘǜ d)¯ q2
1(1ﾘǜ d)¯ q1
It is straightforward to show that the left hand of the previous expression is increasing in ﾘǜ d,a n dt h er i g h t
hand is decreasing in ﾘǜ d.M o r e o v e r ,i fﾘǜ d =
1
2




expression will be true.
Note that: j(1










(S1  S2) A 0




PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4





Let be dw+1 = i(dw) and
j(dw)=i(dw)  dw =
(1(1dw)q)S1
(1(1dw)q)S1+(1dq











Since the denominator is greater than zero, the sign and the roots of the previous expression depend on
the numerator. Notice that the only dierence between this numerator and the function j(dw) in the previous
proposition 2 is that q +1appears instead of q.W ec a nt h e r e f o r es t a t et h a t :
d[V[q+1>1>=1]=d[V[q>1>S2]]
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Moreover, since the equilibrium is decreasing in q (provided that S1 AS 2):
d[V[q>1>=1]  d[V[q>1>S2]]
¥=
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Let S1 AS 2, S3 =0 , n
q ? 1 and consider the selection process V[q>n>] specied by the Eq. (1).
We must rst observe that the dynamic of the system depends on the probabilities of promotion of each type
of agent. If the system is in a period w (or level w)a n dt h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fa nD-agent being promoted (SD(surp))
is greater than that of a E-agent (SE(surp)), then the proportion of D-agents in period w+1is greater than in
w.I . e .t h ep r o p o r t i o no fD-agents increases and the proportion of E-agents decreases.














Lemma 5 If SD>w(surp) AS E>w(surp),t h e ndw+1 Ad w















q.T h e r e f o r e :

















(1dw) A 0 /
dw+1dw
dwew A 0 / dw+1 Ad w ¥
To nd when equilibria d =0and d =1are either stable or unstable, we can study the promotion probabilities
when the system are close to these equilibria. Thus, ifw ep r o v et h a tt h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fp r o m o t i o nf o ra nD-agent
is greater (smaller) than it is for a E-agent, provided that the system is indenitely very close to d =0 ,t h e nw e
can state that these equilibria are unstable (stable). We can do the same thing with d =1 .T h u s ,w eo b t a i nt h e
following result, which explains when equilibria d =0and d =1are either (locally) stable or unstable.
We rst obtain the probability of promotion. An agent can be promoted in two dierent events, i.e. he is
either eligible and successful (H=V=)o rh ei se l i g i b l ea n db u tu n s u c c e s s f u l( H=X=). Therefore, the probability of
an agentﾒ’s following the rule l being promoted (in period w)c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
Sl>w(surp)=Sw(surp@H=V=)Sl>w(H=V=)+Sw(surp@H=X=)Sl>w(H=X=)
Thus, the probability of promotion for an agent who follows rule l is a linear combination of the agentﾒ’s
probability of being in event H=V= (i.e. Sl>w(H=V=))a n di nH=X= (i.e. Sl>w(H=X=)), where the weights are given by
the probability of being promoted in each event (i.e. Sw(surp@H=V=) and Sw(surp@H=X=)).
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t k ES nT 
Figure 1: The grey rectangle represents the Eligible Agents
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Using Figure 1,i ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt od e r i v et h ef o l l o w i n gp r o b a b i l i t i e s :
Sw(surp@H=V=)=m i n {
n
q






























Proportion of A-agents that are eligible and successful
Proportion of A-agents that can be chosen .
If we want to analyze the stability21 of d =1 ,t h e ni ti ss u !cient to nd which probability of promotion is
greater when the state of the system is very close to one (dw ' 1). If the promotion probability of an D-agent
is greater(smaller) than that of a E-agent and this is true as much as the state closes to one is, then the state
d =1will be locally stable(unstable).(Analogously to d =0 ).
Notice that,











Note that HVw, HVd
w , HXw,a n dHXw are polynomials, see the expressions in Section 2. It is straightforward
to derive that lim
dw$1
HVw = n
qS1.A n a l o g o u s l yt oHVd
w , HXw,a n dHXw.
The probabilities SE>w(H=V=) and SE>w(H=X=) are straightforward to derive. We rst replace the HVw, HVd
w ,
HXw,a n dHXw in expression 13 by the expressions in Section 2 ands i m p l i f yt h e m ,a f t e r w a r d s ,w ec a l c u l a t et h e
limits of the expressions when dw goes to 1.
Therefore:
Sw(surp@H=V=) ' min{ 
S1>1} Sw(surp@H=X=) ' max{S1
S2 >0}
SD>w(H=V=) ' n
qS1 SD>w(H=X=) ' n
qS2
SE>w(H=V=) ' S2 SE>w(H=X=) ' 0













S2 =m i n {>S1}
n
q






(min{>S1} +m a x {  S1>0})=
(
n
q if ?S 1
n
q(S1 +   S1)= n










>1}S2 +m a x {
  S1
S2









S2 if ?S 1









S1S2 if ?S 1
S2 if   S1
We know that if SD>dw'1(surp)  (?)SE>dw'1(surp) then d =1is stable (unstable). Thus, if ?S 1,t h e n
d =1will be stable (unstable) provided that n
q  (?) 
S1S2 / n
q  (?) S2
S1.O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i f  S1 then
d =1will be stable (unstable) provided that n
q  (?)S2=
21In this proof, the stability we refer to is always the local stability
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S2S1 if ?S 2
S1 if   S2
If ?S 2 then d =0will be stable (unstable) provided that n
q  (?) 
S2S1 / n
q  (?) S1
S2= Since S1 AS 2,
the state d =0will be unstable provided that ?S 2.O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i f  S2,t h e nd =0will be stable
(unstable) provided that n
q  (?)S1.S i n c en
q  S1 ,   q
nS1 AS 1 AS 2,t h es t a t ed =0will be unstable if
n
q?S 1 and this state will be stable if n
q  S1.
In short:
if ?S 1 then
(
d =1stable if n
q  S2
S1
d =1unstable if n
q ? S2
S1
if ?S 2 then d =0unstable
if   S1 then
(
d =1stable if n
q  S2
d =1unstable if n
q?S 2
if   S2 then
(
d =0stable if n
q  S1
d =0unstable if n
q?S 1
It is straightforward to derive that:
ﾕ• If ?S 1 and,
n
q ? S2
S1 then d =0and d =1are unstable (type I).
n
q  S2
S1 then d =0is unstable and d =1is stable (type II).
ﾕ• If   S1 and,
n
q?S 2 then d =0and d =1are unstable (type I) (type I).
S2  n
q  S1 then d =0is unstable and d =1is stable(type II).
n
qAS 1 then d =0and d =1are stable (type III).




















































































































Figure 2: The vertical axes of these graphs represent n
q and the horizontal axes represent .T h er i g h tg r a p hi st h ec a s e
of S1 ? S2








S1 then d =0and d =1are unstable.
n
q  S2
S1 then d =0is unstable and d =1is stable.
.
If S2   n
q  S1,t h e nd =0is unstable and d =1is stable.
If S1 ?n
q ,t h e nd =0and d =1are stable.
¥
22It is straightforward to show that S2 ?
S2
S1 is always true, and S1 A
S2
S1 C S1 A
(13S1)
S1 C S2






We check the validity of the conjecture by numerical analysis. In order to conduct numerical analysis,
values must be specied for the functionﾒ’s four parameters23: (n>q>>S1).N u m e r i c a l a n a l y s i s w a s c o n d u c t e d







100}.W h e nq =1 0 0 ,aw i d er a n g eo fl o c a ls e l e c t i v i t yi sc o n s i d e r e d : n
q 5 { 1
100>===> 99
100}.I na d d i t i o n ,
we consider other values of q.A f t e r s p e c i f y i n g v a l u e s f o r (n>q>>S1),t h ee q u a t i o n 24 j(d)=0becomes an
equation of just one variable, and it is a quotient of univariate polynomials. It is easy to see that because
HV is dened by a univariate polynomial, and the product of two polynomials in d is a polynomial in d.I ti s
straightforward to prove that the denominator of that quotient is always positive, thus, we only have to check
the roots in the open interval d =( 0 >1) of just one univariate polynomial. This simple numerical analysis does
not present any di!culty and can be done with any mathematical software such as Mathematica or Matlab.
Given the parameter values that we considered, we calculated the roots of this polynomial for 825650 dierent
parameter combinations.
The set of parameters considered is divided into fourp a r t sa c c o r d i n gt op r o p o s i t i o n6 . W eo b t a i n e dt h e
following results:
If  n
q ?S 2 and n
q ? S2
S1,t h e nt h e r ei so n l yo n er o o ti nt h eo p e ni n t e r v a ld =( 0 >1).T h e r e f o r e ,i fs e l e c t i v i t y
is strong enough there is only one inner root and by proposition 6 it will be globally stable.
If  n
q ?S 2 and n
q A S2
S1,t h e nt h e r ei sn o ta n yr o o ti nt h eo p e ni n t e r v a ld =( 0 >1).T h e r e f o r e ,b yp r o p o s i t i o n
6, d =1will be globally stable.
If  n
q 5 [S2>S 1],a si nt h ep r e v i o u sc a s e ,t h e r ei sn o ta n yr o o ti nt h eo p e ni n t e r v a ld =( 0 >1) when S1 A 0=57.
However, there are some few isolated cases in which we found another kind of dynamic behavior. When this
happens, we observe that S1 ? 0=57 and 1
2 ? n
q ? S2
S1.A si ti ss t a t e da b o v e ,i fs e l e c t i v i t yi sh i g he n o u g h ,t h e r e
is only one inner steady state. When selectivity decreases, the steady state d =1can become locally stable
before the inner steady state disappear but in some very fewp a r t i c u l a rc a s e s .A sar e s u l tt w oi n n e rs t e a d ys t a t e s
appear for an exceedingly small set of parameters. This is discussed below.
If  n
q AS 1,t h e r ei so n l yo n er o o ti nt h eo p e ni n t e r v a lo p e ni n t e r v a ld =( 0 >1) and by proposition 6 d =0
and d =1will be locally stable. However, we found just one parameter combination where the conjecture does
not hold in this interval. In this case, both d =0and d =1are locally stable and the inner steady state
remains. Consequently, there are three steady states. When this happens, S1 is very close to 1





Although we cannot state that the conjecture is generically true because the set of parameter (in which the
conjecture is not true) does not have measure zero, we observe that this parameter set is exceedingly small.
For example, if q =5 0we compute the equation j(d)=0for 242550 dierent parameter combinations and we
only found three cases where the conjecture does not hold. When q =1 0 0 ,t h ec o n j e c t u r ea l w a y sh o l d sf o rt h e
parameter set considered.
Anyway, we found that the conjecture always hold if S1 A 0=57.I nt h ec a s eS1 ? 0=57 we found a few cases
where the conjecture does not hold, and only when 1
2 ? n
q ? S2
S1 and  n
q AS 2.T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t  has to
be greater than q
nS2 which is in turn greater than 1
2.T h e i n t e r v a lo f where the conjecture does not hold is
extremely small and belongs to the open interval (q
nS2>1).F o re x a m p l e ,i fq =5 0 , n =2 6 , S1 =5 1and S2 =4 9 ,
the interval of  where the conjecture does not hold belongs to (0=9423> 0=9454).A sS1 increases we observed
that this interval decreases. For example, if q =5 0 , n =2 6 , S1 =5 7and S2 =4 3the interval of  where the
conjecture does not hold belongs to (0=826923> 0=826928).
23We assumed that, S2 =( 13 S1)
24j(d)=0 Ui i(d) 3 d =0 ,a n di(d) is dened in expression (1)
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